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Finding Facts and Making Judgments 
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein∗
Thank you for this Wigmore Award my friends, and especially 
you, Professor Margaret Berger—student, colleague, and mentor—
and for over-honoring me, even at a risk of undermining your own 
credibility. 
Fifty-five years ago, I was delivered from private practice and de-
posited on Mount Olympus at Columbia Law School.  Almost imme-
diately, because of the untimely death of Professor Jerome Michael, I 
was thrown unprepared into the Evidence class, fighting to stay a half 
page ahead of my students. 
The wonderful multi-volume third edition of Wigmore on Evidence 
sat behind my desk.  Almost every page had my yellow reminder slip.  
It looked like it had developed a fungus infection.  Gradually, I 
pulled a few pages ahead of the students.1
Then I was made a judge.  After my eight o’clock Evidence class, 
I would drive to court with students, warning them on the way that it 
was what I said at Columbia—not what I did in court—that counted 
on their law school exam.  A hearsay objection?  Don’t be absurd!  
The jury and I wanted to know all we could about these fascinating 
people and events.2  And now, with x-ray scans and neurological re-
search revealing how people’s minds work, scientific proof that we’re 
all unconsciously biased by reliance on stereotypes (as if we didn’t 
know), DNA, genetics, the Internet and e-mail evidence, sophisti-
cated statistical quantifications and probability estimates, Daubert 
problems, and other esoteric aspects of our craft, I’m falling further 
behind.  Fortunately, each year’s new law clerks, who have been 
 ∗ Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 
 1 Things have perhaps become a bit easier with the advent of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  See Jack B. Weinstein, Is There Scholarship After Death, or Are Evidence 
Teachers Needed After the Federal Rules?, 41 MD. L. REV. 209 (1982).
 2 My attempts to legitimize curiosity by abolishing the rules of hearsay ultimately 
failed to infiltrate the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force 
of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961).
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trained so well by evidence scholars, and the wonderful law review ar-
ticles I read with such anticipation provide hope for comprehension 
of continuing problems of proof. 
EVIDENCE’S THIRD DIMENSION—THE NORMATIVE 
Evidence teachers have rightly instructed their students that a 
trier—whether the judge or jury—is to determine the probability that 
facts existed in the real world: evidence is evaluated and then com-
bined in a logical progression of inferences with evidential hypothe-
ses to determine whether propositions of fact (operative facts) re-
quired by the rule of substantive law have been established to the 
requisite degree of probability.  Rational fact-finding rules the day.3
Much as we try to constrain our judicial inquiry into the facts by 
logic in the quiet confines of our courtrooms, we fail, in part for rea-
sons suggested by Carl Sandburg:  
“Do you solemnly swear before the ever-living God that the tes-
timony you are about to give in this cause shall be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?”   
“No, I don’t.  I can tell you what I saw and what I heard and I’ll 
swear to that by the ever-living God but the more I study about it 
the more sure I am that nobody but the ever-living God knows 
the whole truth and if you summoned Christ as a witness in this 
case what He would tell you would burn your insides with the 
pity and the mystery of it.”4
 3 See, e.g., JEROME MICHAEL & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LOGICAL, LEGAL, AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
(1931); EDMUND M. MORGAN & JOHN M. MAGUIRE, CASES ON EVIDENCE (1934) (a revi-
sion of the 1900 second edition of Thayer’s Evidence Casebook); JAMES BRADLEY 
THAYER, SELECT CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 1 (1892) (“Reasoning, The 
Rational Method of Settling Disputed Questions . . . .”); WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES 
OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985); JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 3, 11–14 (9th ed. 1997) (analysis of lines of proof); JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF: OR THE PROCESS OF PROOF AS GIVEN BY 
LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (2d 
ed. 1931); Margaret A. Berger, Science for Judges IX, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 13 (2007) (sum-
mary of Science for Judges’ program papers); Jerome Michael & Mortimer J. Adler, 
The Trial of an Issue of Fact, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1224, 1462 (1934); D. Michael Risinger, 
Introduction, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 835 (2008); Peter Tillers, Visualizing Evidence and 
Inference in Legal Settings, 6 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1 (2007); William Twining, Argu-
mentation, Stories, and Generalizations: A Comment on Prakken et al. “Sense-Making Soft-
ware,” 6 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 169 (2007).
 4 CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 193 (1936), quoted in Jack B. Weinstein, Some 
Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 
223, 240 (1966).
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While the difficulties of estimating the probability that an opera-
tive fact existed are properly emphasized in our classrooms, less often 
stressed is the lack of stability of the law that defines operative facts 
and therefore our factual inquiries.  Since I shall merely touch on the 
point, it is enough to say here that there is a difference between tri-
ers’ finding facts and their making judgments about what the sub-
stantive law is or should be.  The issue is obvious in such matters as 
negligence, capital punishment, sex crimes and pornography, gender 
discrimination, and punitive damages.  Local community views im-
pinge upon—and manipulate—substantive commands, sometimes 
with the law’s approval, and sometimes with its disdain, as when we 
denominate the process “nullification.”  The subtle impact of norma-
tive judgments affecting the law in particular cases continues to per-
vade our trials, arbitrations, and settlements. 
In a recent case in my court, the matter was starkly posed when a 
middle-aged, otherwise blameless peaceful citizen, who had been ter-
ribly sexually abused as a child but created his own supportive family, 
was discovered through Internet forensics to be viewing child por-
nography in a private locked room of his detached garage.  The 
minimum statutory penalty was five years.  After a guilty verdict, the 
jury was informed of the mandatory penalty.  Jurors then indicated 
that they believed the crime warranted treatment rather than incar-
ceration, and that a guilty verdict would probably not have been ren-
dered had they known of the punishment.5  Of necessity, the result-
ing opinion, granting a motion to set aside the verdict, deals with an 
analysis of colonial juries’ power to decide sentences and impose local 
community views—the stuff of Booker.6  Yet the overall trend, led by 
the Supreme Court, is reducing the community’s input into rules of 
law as applied in court by attenuating the jury’s role.7  Capital cases 
and some non-capital sentencing are perhaps exceptions.  But, in 
fact, biases, community views of equities, and a humane view of life in 
all its wonderful and awe-inspiring complexities, still intrude.  Triers 
make judgments about fairness while they act as factfinders.  Do our 
students appreciate this fascinating third dimension of Evidence?  Do 
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution still guaran-
 5 United States v. Polizzi, __ F. Supp. 2d __, No. 06-CR-22, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26223 (E.D.N.Y. April 1, 2008, revised April 23, 2008).
 6 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Colonial history and practice is 
also the basis for Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
 7 Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of the People, by the People and 
for the People, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (see Part VIII, Juries).
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tee the people’s oversight of the courts through juries—the equiva-
lent of voters exercising supervision over the other branches of gov-
ernment?  I leave you with these questions that trouble me. 
